Thursday, November 24, 2011

RE: Dubious scripts at vim.org

Excerpts from John Beckett's message of Thu Nov 24 07:34:16 +0100 2011:
> It's probably a particular version of someone's ctags. But it
> might be a hacked version which installs a keylogger.
its not from ctags.sourceforge.net which stopped shipping .exe in v
15.5. looks like they recommend cygwin now - but the script does not hip
with cygwin.dll ? If asked google to find md5 and sha1 sums of one of
the executables - no match. This does not mean its malicious though.

Should we keep it? Should we add a warning? .. Well in the end
www.vim.org is not the place to put binaries - I agree.
We don't want the database to be flooded with huge amounts of binary
data - equally important - the same binary data over and over again.

Great that you found it.
How to protect against it in the future?
Does removing it protect users?

I mean browsing scripts at www.vim.org is not that great at all:
You don't see the files which are contained in a zip. You have to
provide duplicate install and plugin information (worst case 3 times:
1) doc/*.txt 2) READMe for github 3) instructions for www.vim.org)
...

Having exe for windows is easy.. What about #! scripts on linux?

Do you expect users to read every line ?

http://stackoverflow.com/questions/2866787/how-to-create-a-bat-file-to-download-file-from-http-ftp-server
shows that its pretty simple to download applications by FTP using VimL
and system ?
I haven't tested it.
But looks trivial to do.

How can we improve security? Switch OS: Use sandboxes, ... ?

Marc Weber

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